Similar to 2006, the primary obstacle to the new truce in Lebanon is not so much the agreement’s language as it is its actual application. According to UN Security Council Resolution 1701, a truce was declared in August of that year following the conclusion of Israel’s previous conflict with Hezbollah. Two days later, the first tripartite meeting between the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), Israel Defense Forces (IDF), and the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was held to discuss implementation. Up until 2015, I helped manage postwar problems as a member of the IDF delegation and then as its chairman. The lessons learned from those years highlight some of the challenges facing the authorities entrusted with enforcing the new ceasefire, ranging from identifying the extent of Israeli efforts to prevent Hezbollah violations to guaranteeing accountability among the Lebanese army and government.
Insights from a former envoy
Fire incidents occurred in the days immediately after the 2006 truce when IDF units remaining in Lebanese territory came across Hezbollah militants who had emerged from concealment. To make matters more complicated, Hezbollah members also infiltrated groups of Lebanese citizens making their way back to their homes. In cooperation with UNIFIL, the IDF progressively withdrew to Israel in the weeks that followed. Prior to the LAF’s arrival, the peacekeeping force occupied the areas of southern Lebanon that were covered by Resolution 1701. In addition to coordinating the withdrawal, the tripartite sessions helped the parties on the ground communicate with one another. In addition, the IDF carried out engineering tasks that Lebanese officials described as violations, such as repairing the border security barrier and demolishing enemy infrastructure. The game’s regulations changed in the year after the 2006 conflict. When UNIFIL forces first patrolled the south, they found a large number of Hezbollah military installations. In anticipation of inspection and dismantling, the IDF informed UNIFIL of other locations. UNIFIL instead provided the LAF with the information, and the LAF typically responded that the assets were now under army control or that the installations in concern had been inspected “without findings.” Hezbollah was given ample time to vacate such areas before LAF or UNIFIL soldiers actually entered them. Any stray weapons discovered there were reportedly confiscated by the LAF, but IDF intelligence revealed that they were later returned to Hezbollah.
The 2006 ceasefire revisited
Furthermore, cars suspected of engaging in Hezbollah military activity could not be searched at UNIFIL checkpoints. Additionally, Hezbollah members were allegedly allowed to show special identification documents at LAF checkpoints, allowing them to enter without being inspected. During the tripartite negotiations, LAF officials maintained that the people conducting suspicious activities in these regions were, in fact, LAF intelligence personnel dressed in civilian clothes. Israeli intelligence repeatedly refuted this assertion. In a similar vein, Hezbollah’s elite Radwan Force personnel who used professional cameras to monitor the border were usually referred to as “photojournalists” and “bird watchers,” while those who carried assault guns were called “just hunters.” Six peacekeepers were killed in the summer of 2007 when a car bomb struck a Spanish UNIFIL battalion that was patrolling close to a Hezbollah stronghold in al-Khiam. The Spanish contingent thereafter drastically reduced its operations. Many homes in the region were eventually erected atop Hezbollah bunkers and other subterranean equipment, according to IDF aerial photos. A French general who was in Israel at the time I gave him this information stated that while his government agreed with the problem, they disagreed on the necessary policy to address it. As a result, Hezbollah’s transgressions went unanswered.
Israel’s diplomatic challenges
Hezbollah promptly warned that this was a “red line” when France dispatched surveillance drones to UNIFIL to enhance the force’s situational awareness. The drones were returned home without ever being used in Lebanon as Paris recoiled. Later, UNIFIL was coerced by Hezbollah to drop plans to place security cameras at UN locations. Hezbollah persisted in its long-running campaign of harassment against UNIFIL patrols in the meantime, threatening their staff, obstructing their travel, and even prohibiting photography and other fundamental forms of ground-level monitoring of the situation.
Lessons from tripartite talks
Even in the several instances where the identities of these criminals were known, such as the 2022 murder of Irish peacekeeper Sean Rooney, the Lebanese government did not hold them accountable. The LAF’s justifications and the regions deemed “off-limits” to UNIFIL gradually grew. The army attempted to describe Hezbollah installations as “private property,” “areas of strategic importance” to the LAF, or even surveillance stations owned by the fictitious environmental organization “Green Without Borders.” In other instances, the army informed peacekeepers that local animosity was too great or that the roads were too small for them to travel. Hezbollah has plenty of unmonitored locations to station the thousands of military assets that Israel has destroyed, thanks to UNIFIL’s gradual acceptance of these expanding limits.
